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It is usual to see in nationalism a modern, secular ideology that replaces the religious 
systems found in premodern, traditional societies. In this view, ‘religion’ and 
‘nationalism’ figure as two terms in the conventional distinction between tradition and 
modernity and in an evolutionary framework that sees an inevitable movement—
whether evolutionary or destructive—from the one to the other. (Smith 2003: 9) 
 
  The conventional understanding of the relationship between nationalism and 
religion, so succinctly summarised in the above-quoted paragraph from Anthony 
Smith’s Chosen Peoples (2003), is now increasingly often called into question. The 
persistence of religious practices and beliefs in virtually all contemporary societies, 
and the interweaving of religious and nationalist discourses across the world have 
driven many scholars to rethink the well-worn, ahistorical and Eurocentric opposition 
of modernity and tradition, as well as the concomitant understanding of the 
relationship between religion and nationalism (Juergensmeyer 1993; van der Veer 
1994; Van der Veer and Lehmann 1999; Smith 2003; Spohn 2003). This paper adds to 
this line of debate by examining a particular version of nationalism which clearly 
defies any simplistic, dichotomising notions of the relationship between religion and 
nationalism.   
  One of the chief obstacles to the development of a more nuanced approach to the 
relationship between religion and nationalism is the prevailing understanding of 
secularisation, which also forms a central ingredient of the historical narrative that 
assumes a fundamental disruption between modernity and tradition. In most cases, 
secularisation is equated with a radical and linear decline of religious beliefs and 
practices, if not with a wholesale disappearance of religion from all aspects of human 
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life. However, even a cursory examination of debates about among sociologists of 
religion (e.g. Dobbelaere 1981; Tschannen 1992) would reveal that such an 
understanding of secularisation has long been regarded as seriously flawed and 
empirically unsustainable. While the period of European revolutions was indeed 
followed by a rise of secular nationalisms that demanded a disentanglement of 
religion and politics, it is also clear that this disentanglement often remained a 
political ideal rather than a reality. Instead of being wiped out, religious 
understandings of nationhood coexisted with secular ones and entered a range of 
different relations with them (Rémond 1999; McLeod 2000).  
  Ironically, both modernist theorists of nationalism as well as their critics tend to 
ignore these critical revisions of the secularisation thesis, and establish a sharp 
opposition between secular (and anti-religious) nationalism on the one hand, and 
religious (and anti-secular) nationalism on the other hand. Building on a review of 
recent debates on secularisation among sociologists of religion, this paper argues that 
these two varieties of nationalism in fact form the opposite ends of a continuum along 
which we can find a wide array of nationalisms which draw on religious ideas and 
symbols but are not necessarily inimical to the modernist, secular view of the world.iii 
Unlike most cases of religious nationalism examined in nationalism literature so far, 
these modernist religious nationalisms acknowledge – though not necessarily approve 
of – the existence of secular states, and abide by their rules. After outlining the main 
traits of such modernist religious nationalism, the paper examines one of its most 
prominent manifestations: the Protestant modernist nationalism. It discusses the 
common interpretation of Max Weber’s widely influential thesis about the Protestant 
ethic and the spirit of capitalism, and points to its confluence with nineteenth-century 
Protestant nationalisms in Germany and Britain. The remainder of the paper examines 
recent cases of modernist religious nationalisms arising in post-Cold Eastern Europe, 
with a particular focus on Slovenia. Special attention is paid to the convergence of 
modernist religious nationalisms and the contemporary discourse on 
‘Europeanisation’ in the region, and to the ways in which these discourses are being 
used to belittle particular religious traditions and nations as being incapable of 
European integration, democratisation or modernisation.    
Religion, nationalism and secularisation 
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  As a rule, proponents of the modernist approach to nations and nationalism are 
criticised for assuming a fundamental incompatibility and rivalry between nationalism 
and religion, ruling out the possibility of overlapping between the two. Yet as Smith 
(2003) rightly points out, things are more complicated than that. In many seminal 
works on nationalism published since the 1960s, religion is seen as somewhat 
paradoxically both conducive and opposed to the rise of nationalism. By and large, it 
is treated as a source that often provided the raw materials for the creation of modern 
nationalism, but remained fundamentally alien and even hostile to it. Confessional 
identities of the early modern period, initiated by the Reformation in the sixteenth 
century, are often acknowledged as being of immense importance to the formation of 
national identities. Yet at the same time, they are also regarded as significantly 
different from fully blown modern national identities: in a characteristic formulation 
provided by Heinz Schilling, these identities belong to ‘a transitional type of 
identification’, located half-way between mediaeval and modern secular identity 
(Schilling 1995: 11).   
  The argument developed by Eric Hobsbawm in his Nations and Nationalism since 
1780 (1990) is a case in point. Hobsbawm accepts that religion and national 
consciousness can be tightly intertwined, pointing out that both are methods of 
establishing commonality among people who otherwise have little in common. 
Nevertheless, he keeps treating religion as inherently inimical to nationalism, arguing 
that ‘modern nationalism has usually […] treated it with considerable reserve as a 
force which could challenge the “nation’s” monopoly claim to its members’ loyalty’ 
(1990: 68). A similarly hesitant acknowledgment of links between nationalism and 
religion can be found in Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983). 
Anderson clearly singles out Protestantism as one of the key factors contributing to 
the erosion of the sacred imagined community and the rise of new, national imagined 
communities. Yet while acknowledging that the new print languages adopted by 
Protestant reformers laid the bases for national consciousness, he also emphasises that 
at its origins, the fixing of these print languages was largely unselfconscious and was 
not underpinned by nationalist impulses. At the very most, then, nationalism should 
be seen as an unintended consequence of Protestantism.      
  Ernest Gellner’s work on nationalism is another case in point. He does not deny the 
connections between religion and nationalism, and is particularly keen to 
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acknowledge the link between Protestantism or ‘Protestant-type’ attitudes and 
nationalism (Gellner 1968: 308; 1983: 41-42; 1997: 22-23). In his last, posthumously 
published book on nationalism, he even states that ‘Protestant-type’ religious 
movements ‘may favour identification with a culture, albeit legitimated by linkage to 
a faith and a path of salvation’ (Gellner 1997: 22-23). Nevertheless, he believes these 
links do not jeopardise his main argument, and insists that the merging of polity and 
culture, i.e. nationalism, is by and large characteristic only of industrialised, that is 
modernised societies. This is not to say that religions, or other elements of pre-
modern high cultures, cannot become a part of the ‘idioms of modern nations’. 
However, in doing so, they must dissolve themselves as religions if they are to attract 
the entire society: ‘the price these high cultures pay for becoming the idiom of entire 
territorial nations, instead of appertaining to a clerkly stratum only, is that they 
become secularized’ (Gellner 1983: 78).  
  One may well agree with Anthony Smith’s claim that in modernist approaches, 
‘nations and nationalism are treated as wholly recent and novel phenomena, and a 
secular, anthropocentric, and anticlerical modernity is always conterposed to tradition 
and traditional society with its emphasis on custom and religion’ (2003: 10). Yet to 
argue, on the basis of that, that all modernist theorists also necessarily deny the 
possibility of religious nationalism is going a step too far. In principle, most 
proponents of the modernist approach to nationalism would probably agree with many 
of the claims usually fostered by their critics – for example with the claim that 
religion was not only involved in the creation of nations, but remains a constitutive 
element of modern national identities to the present day. However, they would also 
insist that the position of religion in a modern society is significantly different from 
the position held before the advent of secularisation.  
  Why, then, does the polarisation of the debate on nationalism and religion persist? 
Arguably, one of the major reasons for the current confusion is a rather unspecified 
and simplistic understanding of ‘secularisation’. For most participants in the debate, 
secularisation seems to equal a wholesale decline, if not outright disappearance of 
religion. Secular nationalism is therefore seen as entirely incompatible and in fact 
hostile to religion; if secular nationalism is to triumph, religion necessarily has to 
wither away. However, even a brief scan of debates among sociologists of religion 
would reveal a far more complex picture of secularisation. A steady trickle of works 
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sceptical of the radical version of the secularisation thesis (Luckmann 1967; Bellah 
1967; Bell 1977), and even rejecting it as a social myth (Glasner 1977), emerged 
already in the late 1960s and the1970s. By the 1990s, this strain of criticisms has 
managed to attract substantial support, and lead to a major reshuffling of classical 
theories of secularisation. The ‘disappearance thesis’, according to which 
modernisation was bound to lead into a general decline in the prestige of religious 
symbols, doctrines and institutions in all spheres of life, was discredited. Instead, 
more complex, multi-level models for the analysis of secularisation were devised (see 
for example Dobbelaere 1981). It was noted that although secularisation generally 
leads to a declining authority of religion at least in some social spheres, it does not 
automatically amount to a wholesale disappearance of religion (Tschannen 1992). To 
sum up, the revised version of the secularisation theory acknowledges that 
secularisation is not necessarily a linear, universal and inevitable process, but rather ‘a 
historically variable and contingent outcome’, and ‘an episodic, uneven, and perhaps 
even reversible process’ (Gorski 2003: 121).  
  Another important point to note is that many sociologists of religion acknowledge 
the existence of persistent alliances between religion and nationalism. These are 
facilitated by the fact that religion is becoming increasingly detached from established 
religious institutions, and ‘may be invested with highly diverse meanings and used for 
a wide variety of purposes [...] both within and outside the framework of religious 
organizations and, where they exist, state religions’ (Beckford 1989: 171). Rather then 
being rejected by secular nation-states, then, religious beliefs and practices may easily 
be co-opted and supported by them, in particular if they are seen to play a major 
social role, for example functioning as an instrument of national defence or survival 
(Martin 1978; Bruce 1996). According to David Martin (1978), the link between 
nationhood and religion is of enormous importance, and functions as a necessary 
condition for the flourishing of religious attachment in most European countries. The 
fact that Christianity may be in contradiction or competition with nationalism is, in his 
view, no obstacle to that:  
Christianity may be a religion which rejects the worship of Caesar or the exaltation of 
the ethnic group, but in order to retain even the possibility of suggesting more worthy 
objects of praise, it must be positively related to the national consciousness, 
particularly as this is highlighted in a myth of national origin. (Martin 1978: 101) 
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  Also several historians of nineteenth century, significantly influenced by the debates 
among sociologists, began to challenge the standard accounts of how secularisation 
actually happened, and raised the question of whether it really led to a linear decline 
of religion and religious varieties of nationalism. According to Hugh McLeod (2000), 
the general tendency of recent historical examinations has actually been to accentuate 
the continuing significance of religious beliefs and of the churches throughout the 
nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century; although the rise of 
nationalism and racism has indeed potentially weakened the appeal of religious 
affiliations, many varieties of nationalism continued to contain a strong religious 
ingredient. According to some authors, the growth of the modern nation-state actually 
led to a strengthening rather than demise of Christianity, since it provided the 
churches with better means to Christianise the people (Turner 1988). 
  What is the bearing of these theories and findings for the current debates about 
religious nationalism among nationalism scholars? Firstly, they suggest that a 
substantial part of the recent debates among nationalism scholars is somewhat 
misplaced. If secularisation does not mean a wholesale disappearance of religion, then 
the fact that classic, modernist approaches to nationalism insist on the confluence of 
secularisation and the rise of nationalism is not, in itself, a problem. What is 
problematic is only the belief – shared not just by modernist theorists but often also 
by their critics – that secularisation necessarily wipes out religious varieties of 
nationalism. Contrary to what many critics of modernist approaches to nationalism 
seem to suggest, this belief is not only wrong when applied to the non-Western world, 
but does not match the empirical record for Western Europe either: even today, many 
European states maintain close links with religious institutions, and cannot be seen as 
entirely disassociated from religion. Obviously, there is no need to ‘step outside the 
magic circle of the modern West’ to grasp the link between religion and nationalism 
(Smith 2005: 415).  
  Secondly, if secularisation does not necessarily lead into a disappearance of religion, 
the modern situation need not be reduced to a black-and-white confrontation of fully 
secular, anti-religious nationalisms, and uncompromisingly anti-secular religious 
nationalisms. In addition, we need to acknowledge also the existence of a wide array 
of modernist religious nationalisms situated somewhere between these two extremes. 
This term should cover all those varieties of religious nationalism which acknowledge 
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– though not necessarily approve of – the existence of secular states, and abide by 
their rules. This abidance does not automatically mean a whole-sale disassociation of 
religion and religious nationalism from the state, but can include various forms of 
cooperation between the two, as long as they are regulated primarily by the state 
rather than religious institutions themselves. Unlike anti-secular religious 
nationalisms which seek to ‘rescue the nation from the profane Western ‘nation-state’ 
and its materialist corruptions’ (Smith 2003: 415), the modernist versions of religious 
nationalism normally acknowledge the legitimacy of the modern, secular nation-state. 
Sometimes, they are also prepared to embrace the ‘materialism’ of capitalist societies, 
as well as other aspects regarded as characteristic of Western modernity, ranging from 
democracy to gender equality. 
Weber’s thesis and Protestant nationalisms in nineteenth-century Europe    
  In response to modernist and secularist discourses and policies, virtually all major 
religions have become involved in such modernist varieties of religious nationalism. 
The Second Vatican Council clearly sought to bring the Catholic Church up-to-date 
with modern times, however limited the success of this attempt might have been, and 
the Islamic tradition had diversified into a range of forms, some of them expressly 
open to modern values and ideas, including the secular state. However, historically, 
various religions have not been equally willing to enter into an alliance with the 
secular state, nor were they all equally supportive of various aspects of modernisation. 
Most importantly, these historically arising differences between religions have slowly 
been transformed into a rule: only some religions – most notably Protestantism – 
came to be considered as intrinsically compatible with the exigencies of the secular 
state and the demands of the modern society, while others began to be regarded as 
stumbling blocks, inherently hostile to modernisation and progress.  
  Throughout the nineteenth and well into the early twentieth century, the 
classification of religions with regard to their elective affinities with modernity 
constituted a major preoccupation of European intellectuals, acquiring particular 
prominence with the publication of Max Weber’s Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism (1904-5) and R. H. Tawney’s Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (1926). 
Since Weber, many have sought to explain modern developments by reference to 
religion, and what Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt wrote in 1968 remains almost equally 
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valid today: ‘Many seek in the Protestant ethic or some equivalent the key to an 
understanding of why some non-Western countries have achieved modernization 
while others have not’ (Eisenstadt 1968: 3). Several scholars investigating the 
transformation of the Islamic tradition in the twentieth century have followed this line 
of enquiry, likening Islamic reform movements and their impact on Muslim societies 
with Protestant Reformation and its effects on the development of the modern 
Western culture (Rodinson 1973 [1966]; Gellner 1968; Bocock 1971; Goldberg 1991; 
Khan 2003). Some have even gone as far as to claim that much like Calvinist 
theology, certain doctrines advocated by the Muslim reformist movements display 
affinities with modern capitalism (Bocock 1971: 369). In a similar vein, Japanese 
social scientists understood Weber’s theory as a plot for a successful modernization of 
their own country, and looked for functional equivalents to Protestantism in Japan 
(Schwentker 2005). Analogous debates about modernity and Protestantism developed 
also in relation to South Korea (Hong 2001) and Latin America (Gill 2004). 
  So far, most nationalism scholars have failed to appreciate the full implications of 
this long-standing tendency to explain the world history, social differences, and thus 
also progress and backwardness, in terms of religion. Most importantly, they failed to 
notice that since the nineteenth century, this intellectual tradition has developed an 
influential nationalist inflection. In fact, it became deeply implicated in the rise of the 
most explicitly and decidedly modernist religious nationalisms so far: the Protestant 
nationalisms of nineteenth century Europe. Unlike fully secular nationalisms, which 
seek the roots of progress and development in the Enlightenment, these nationalisms 
were based on another version of the modernist narrative – one which locates the 
beginnings of modernity in Protestantism.iv Consequently, proponents of modernist 
Protestant nationalisms believed that Protestant nations were best equipped for 
development and progress, including things such as industrialisation, adoption of 
democracy and religious pluralism.  
  Many would probably be tempted to ascribe these arguments directly to Max Weber 
and his followers. However, various theories about the relationship between religion 
and economy can be traced back to the sixteenth century, and in Weber’s time, beliefs 
in the link between Protestantism and economic progress were in fact a commonplace. 
Rather than standing at the beginning of this discussion, Weber then simply 
reinforced an existing trend of argumentation, instilling it with new and original ideas 
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(Münch 1993: 53; cf. Nipperdey 1993: 76; Kitch 1967). Although his scholarly work 
was detached from the heightened, passionate debates on this issue, he certainly began 
writing his essay on The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism  
with the assurance that it was the conventional opinion of his contemporaries that 
there was a close connection between religion and society. They especially believed 
that the differences between Protestants and Catholics had a strong impact on social 
structure and social status […] The burden of proof was not with those who held this 
assumption but with those who would deny it. (Nipperdey 1993: 73)  
  It should certainly be noted that Weber carefully avoided claims about a 
straightforward, necessary connection between Protestantism and modernity 
(Nipperdey 1993: 79), and that his thesis operates largely at the level of unintended 
consequences (Bruce 1990). Nevertheless, much of its popular reception and 
subsequent scholarly debate continues to understand the relation between modern 
developments, especially capitalism, and Protestantism as an almost automatic causal 
relationship. Regardless of what Weber himself thought and wrote about the issue, 
this ‘common interpretation’ of his thesis, namely the belief that the rise of industrial 
capitalism was facilitated by Protestantism and therefore occurred earlier in 
predominantly Protestant countries, has taken on ‘a life of its own’ (Delacroix and 
Nielsen 2001: 510). Despite various criticisms levelled at such interpenetrations of 
Weber’s theory, beliefs about Protestantism being the well-spring of modernity 
continue to permeate much of the contemporary sociological and economic writing.  
  Two of the best-known historical cases of modernist Protestant nationalism, based 
on this common interpretation of Weber’s thesis, can be found in late nineteenth-
century Britain and Germany. In Britain, Protestantism provided the linchpin of 
national identity throughout much of the nineteenth century (Colley 1996; McBride 
and Claydon 1998; Clark 2000). In this period, Britishness was defined primarily in 
opposition to Roman Catholicism, and Britain was believed to be a chosen nation, 
destined to defend and propagate reformed Christianity (Wolffe 1991; cf. Arnstein 
1982; Griffin 2004). Some of the main objections against Catholicism were based on 
the belief that Catholicism was a religion of the past, bound to dissipate with the 
advancement of modernisation, and give way to a more progressive religion – 
Protestantism. In the Protestant vision of history, the global march of civilisation was 
linked to Protestantism, while Catholicism was regarded as the retrograde religion, as 
‘the primitive that Protestantism leaves behind’ (Griffin 2004: 5). 
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  Several major exponents of anti-Catholicism in nineteenth-century Britain have 
attempted to explain the variations in progress and backwardness in terms of religious 
differences. According to J. E. C. Welldon (1854-1937), Bishop of Calcutta, 
‘wherever there was a country that was stationary and retrogressive it was Catholic, 
wherever there was a people which was progressive and Imperial it was Protestant’ 
(quoted in McLeod 2000: 236). In a similar vein, Richard Paul Blakeney (1820-84), 
author of Popery in its Social Aspect (1852), argued that economic success was 
inversely related to the influence of Catholicism in a particular country or region, 
providing as examples the contrast between Catholic Ireland and Protestant Scotland, 
as well as, within Ireland itself, Protestant Ulster and the Catholic south (Wolffe 
1991: 120- 121). Finally, Hensley Henson (1863-1947), Canon of Westminster, who 
later became Bishop of Durham, maintained that Britain was more Christian than 
other European countries, because Protestantism, with its rationalism and propensity 
for freedom, was more in tune with the modern age (quoted in McLeod 2000: 235).  
  In much of the nineteenth-century Germany, similar views held sway. Anti-
Catholicism began rising already in the mid-nineteenth century, along with the revival 
of popular Catholicism (Gross 2005), reaching its peak during the Kulturkampf. In 
this period, Protestantism was becoming more firmly associated with the German 
national character and its progress, thus excluding Roman Catholicism as backward, 
uncivilised and, fundamentally, un-German (Münch 1993: 58; cf. Smith 1995a; Stayer 
2000; Gross 2005 and Healy 2003 for extended examinations of particular aspects). 
Such views were particularly popular among the so-called liberal Protestants – 
Protestants by birth, but largely unbelievers. In their view, the beginning of 
everything valuable in German history and character should be sought in the 
Reformation. By contrast, the Roman Catholic Church stood as the main enemy of the 
newly established German nation-state: it was seen as an alternative, supranational 
source of loyalty, and functioned as a symbol for everything the proponents of 
progress detested: ‘backwardness’, ‘superstition’, ‘mediavelism’ (Blackbourn 2002: 
213). As such, it was often accused of being a ‘brake on civilisation’, a form of 
‘pathology’, a symbol of ‘stagnation’ (ibid.). The popular liberal periodical 
Gartenlaube, for example, often served as an outlet for various anti-Catholic 
sentiments, including complaints about the Catholic population’s ‘educational deficit’ 
and backwardness (Gross 2005: 151). 
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  Arguably, both the German Kulturkampf as well as the British ‘anti-Catholic 
crusade’ of the nineteenth century can be seen as particular strategies of nation-
building, based on a combination of modernist and religious nationalist narratives, 
aimed at creating a common national high culture suffused with values largely 
synonymous with those of liberal Protestant nationalism (cf. Smith 1995a: 3). In both 
cases, this nation-building was primarily aimed at assimilating the Catholic 
populations, especially peripheral ones: Poles in the case of the German Empire 
(Trzeciakowski 1990), Irishmen and Irishwomen in the case of Britain. Most 
importantly, in both Germany and Britain, religion remained of major importance 
despite, and perhaps because of, the rise of nationalism. While this modernist version 
of religious nationalism was particularly prominent in the nineteenth century, a 
similar confluence of nationalist, religious and modernist discourses could be found 
also in some parts of the post-Cold-War Eastern Europe. However, this time, religious 
nationalism became intertwined with a new version of modernisation theory: the 
theory of Europeanisation. In line with this theory, some nations and some religious 
traditions were seen as inherently more ‘European’, and thus more open to European 
integration than others.   
Modernist religious nationalisms in post-Cold-War Eastern Europe  
  The dissolution of the Cold War arrangement of the world went hand in hand with a 
resurgence of old narratives and preoccupations, ranging from nationalism and racism 
to pre-World War II geopolitical concerns. The division of Europe into two socially, 
economically and politically opposed halves, implementing two different models of 
modernisation, one socialist or communist and the other liberal-capitalist, was 
replaced by an older mental mapping pitting civilised, progressive Western Europe 
against underdeveloped Eastern Europe or the Balkans (cf. Wolff 1994; Todorova 
1997). Striving for the same goals and competing for the same resources, countries of 
Europe East and West were again seen as parts of the same developmental continuum, 
projected onto geographical space, stretching from the developed West to the 
underdeveloped East, or alternatively, from the civilised Europe to the chaos and 
barbarity of the Balkans.  
  The rise of this old-new geopolitical mapping was accompanied by a renewed 
interest in modernisation theory and explanations of unequal development, and a 
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return of well-worn questions such as why some countries have achieved 
modernization later than others. Religion was among the obvious contenders for the 
throne. For Grace Davie (2000: 4), it is precisely religious traditions that can explain 
the existing differences in development between Europe and the Balkans, as well as 
prospects for and limits of further European enlargement:  
Countries that belonged, and continue to belong, to Western rather than Orthodox 
Christianity may well find it easier to realise their political and economic aspirations. 
Despite their real economic difficulties, their aim is to re-establish Western traditions; 
they are not learning something totally new. (Davie 2000:4) 
  Closely similar arguments were propounded by a number of intellectuals engaged in 
the debate about Central Europe in the late 1980s. The legacy of Western Christianity 
was seen as one of the pillars of Central European culture, which was believed to be 
fundamentally different from that characteristic of the realm of Eastern Christianity 
(Schöpflin 1989: 13-14, 19-20; Duray 1989: 98). Last but certainly not least, the old 
divide between Latin and Orthodox Christianity was highlighted as a major 
civilisational split also in the infamous thesis about the clash of civilisations 
(Huntington 1996), according to which Eastern and Western Europe are significantly 
more divided by the old split between Eastern and Western Christianity than by the 
Iron Curtain. 
  Amidst all these arguments, the newly restored nationalist narratives in Eastern 
Europe had no shortage of resources to draw upon when trying to define the 
distinguishing elements of individual national identities. All across the region, 
religion became intertwined with nationalism, and religious differences were often 
seen as being of paramount importance to national identities (Borowik 1997; Ramet 
1998; Spohn 1998; Tomka and Zulehner 2000; Perica 2002; Merdjanova 2002; Flora 
et al. 2005). It has less often been acknowledged, however, that religion was also 
regularly used to prove a distinctly European or Western character of a particular 
nation, as well as its propensity – or lack of it – towards modernisation, democracy, 
pluralism and capitalism. In the Balkans, people would often tend to explain the 
progress and backwardness by reference to religion: particularly Orthodoxy and Islam 
were often mentioned as factors hindering development and transition to democracy 
(Bremer 2002). In Croatia, for example, Catholicism was not only used to delineate 
Croats from their predominantly Orthodox eastern and southern neighbours, but also 
 13
‘to prove similarity, continuity and participation in what is seen as glorious aspects of 
European traditions’ (Povrzanović Frykman 2002: 171). 
  A similar confluence of Eurocentric, modernist and nationalist discourses on religion 
occurred in Slovenia as well. Yet unlike in other cases, where the main dividing line 
was drawn between Latin and Orthodox Christianity, this case often involved drawing 
a line between countries that experienced Protestant Reformation and those without 
such a legacy. According to a substantial part of contemporary Slovenian 
intellectuals, politicians and other opinion-makers, Protestant Reformation crucially 
contributed to the formation of modern values, norms, practices and institutions. With 
that, it also helped the Slovenian nation to follow the highest civilisational standards 
and fostered its integration into modern European culture and civilisation.  
Protestant Nationalism in Slovenia  
  The rise of Protestant (primarily Lutheran) movements in sixteenth-century 
Carniolav constitutes a major episode in the dominant version of the contemporary 
Slovenian national narrative. It is cherished primarily for its contribution to the 
creation of Slovenian national language and literature, but often also for facilitating 
the nation’s transition into modernity. The Protestant preacher Primož Trubar (1508-
1586) is widely considered as one of the most important Slovenians. His portrait 
features on one of the Slovenian banknotes, and is bound to appear also on the 
Slovenian one-euro coin. Finally, the Slovenian national calendar, which came into 
effect in 1991, lists 31 October, the day on which Luther nailed his 95 theses on the 
door of the Wittenberg Church in 1517, as a holiday: the Day of Reformation. 
However, despite all the public praise for Protestantism, most of the contemporary 
Slovenian population is Catholic. The sixteenth-century Lutheran reform movement 
did not last long: by the mid-seventeenth century, the population of Carniola was 
successfully re-catholicised, and remained predominantly Catholic until today. At the 
last population census in 2002, 57.8% of the interviewees declared themselves as 
Catholic, and only 0.8% as Protestant (Šircelj 2003: 173). The dominant version of 
contemporary Slovenian religious nationalism is linked to Catholicism: by essence, 
Slovenians are believed to be a Roman Catholic nation (cf. Velikonja 1999). 
Arguably, two distinct religious nationalisms are at work in present-day Slovenia: one 
linked to Catholicism, the other to Protestantism.  
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  This dual structure of Slovenian religious nationalism and the prominent role 
accorded to Protestantism in the Slovenian national narrative are far from being new 
phenomena. Protestant reformation had featured as a major, if often disputed, element 
of the Slovenian national narrative virtually ever since the formation of Slovenian 
nationalism in the nineteenth century. The interpretation of its role in national history 
has been subject to a range of heated discussions in both scholarly circles and the 
wider public, and has gone through a series of re-evaluations. The debates were 
habitually couched in terms of modernisation, with competing interpretations coming 
from liberal circles on the one hand and Catholic circles on the other hand. In the late 
nineteenth and the early twentieth century, Slovenian liberals were regularly 
associating Protestantism with progress and modernisation, and regarded the 
Protestant movement in Carniola as a precursor to their own political ideas and 
agendas. Views put forward by Ivan Cankar (1876-1918), a famous Slovenian writer, 
poet and dramatis, are a characteristic example of this pre-war liberal stance. In a 
lecture on Trubar delivered in 1908, Cankar argued that all contributions to ‘spiritual 
and social progress’ among Slovenians were coming exclusively from Protestants; 
whoever remained Catholic after the Reformation was, in his opinion, either ignorant 
or cowardly (quoted in Zadravec 1984: 100).  
  Predictably, the Catholic side was adamantly against such an interpretation. Some 
Catholic opinion makers, most notably Bishop Anton Martin Slomšek (1800-1862), 
acknowledged the contribution of Protestant reformers to the formation of Slovenian 
language and literature. However, they also insisted that he was a heretic, leading the 
nation away from its true faith. In their view, Protestantism was foreign to the 
traditionally Catholic Slovenian soul and, hadn’t it been for the Catholic Church, 
would have led to a wholesale assimilation of Slovenians into German culture. Well 
into the second half of the twentieth century, the Slovenian Catholic circles believed 
Protestantism and Catholicism belonged to the opposite sides of the tradition-
modernity divide, with Catholicism defending traditional values against the onslaught 
of liberalism, rationalism and capitalism. Some of the most vigorous criticisms of 
Protestantism have been voiced by Janez Evangelist Krek (1865-1917), a Catholic 
priest and one of the foremost ideologues of the People’s Party in the late nineteenth 
and the early twentieth century. Krek was a Christian socialist profoundly hostile to 
liberalism, rationalism, secularisation and capitalism. For him, Protestantism was 
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intimately linked with these modern developments, and was to be feared precisely 
because of that, as well as because it was associated with the threat of Germanisation 
(cf. Rogel 1977: 34-35).  
  After the Second World War, both liberal and Catholic interpretations of 
Protestantism were sidelined, and another, Marxist narrative, occupied the centre-
stage. This narrative was most clearly laid out in the works written by Edvard Kardelj 
(1910-1979), one of the chief ideologues of Tito’s Yugoslavia. As Carole Rogel 
observed, Kardelj did concede that Protestantism contributed to the development of a 
Slovenian national consciousness, yet otherwise had little praise for Slovene religious 
reformers. Particularly in the 1939 edition of his Development of the Slovenian 
National Question, Trubar ‘is depicted as an opportunist, an agent of the Protestant 
nobility, who like Luther – although less brutally – turned against the peasant-
plebeian democratic revolution of the sixteenth century’ (Rogel 1984: 53).  
  The late 1980s saw a gradual demise of Marxist interpretations, and a resurgence of 
pre-war nationalist discourses, including the two competing versions of Slovenian 
religious nationalism: the Protestant and the Catholic one. The 400th anniversary of 
the first translation of the Bible in 1984 and the 400th anniversary of Primož Trubar’s 
death in 1986 were both accompanied by a series of commemorative events and 
publications dedicated to Protestantism, including the first translation of Weber’s 
Protestant Ethic into Slovenian. The celebrations reached also into various forms of 
mass culture, culminating in the screening of the TV series Primož Trubar (1986) and 
the film Heretik (1986). These developments coincided with the general rise of 
nationalisms all across the Yugoslav federation, as well as with the increased public 
prominence of major religious institutions – in Slovenia primarily the Catholic 
Church. Arguably, the Protestant nationalism of post-Cold-War Slovenia was to an 
extent fuelled by the wish to curb the rising influence of the Catholic Church. Not 
surprisingly, the conflict between the promoters of Protestantism and their opponents 
was often mapped onto several other layers of ideological conflict: liberal vs. 
conservative, communist vs. anti-communist, secular vs. Catholic, modern vs. 
traditional.    
  Throughout the 1990s, proponents of Protestantism repeatedly associated Protestant 
Reformation with ‘the most progressive trends’ (Unknown author 1995: 3) and 
‘civilisational progress’ (cf. STA 1996: 2), and Protestant nations were often singled 
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out as ‘economically, culturally, socially and civilisationally very developed’ (Grgič 
1997: 31). According to the Bishop of the Evangelical Church in Slovenia, Geza 
Erniša, Europe would have been far more backward were it not for the Protestants 
(quoted in Žunec 2003: 64). In the view of the Slovenian prime Minister, it was 
thanks to Protestant writers and intellectuals that Slovenians ‘have entered into 
historical and civilisational development’ (quoted in Mlinarič 2002: 3). A particularly 
often mentioned aspect of development and modernisation allegedly brought by 
Protestantism was capitalism. Oto Norčič, a distinguished Slovenian economist and 
the first president of the Slovenian Protestant Society, argued that Protestant families 
living in sixteenth-century Carniola were ‘bearers of the early development of 
capitalism in Slovenia’. Had the Habsburg Empire not opted for  Catholicism, argued 
Norčič, these families would have secured a much earlier development of industrial 
capitalism in the region (Norčič 1999: 16). Instead, ‘the Counter-reformation pushed 
us back into ideological and material subordination, which has fatally slowed down or 
even stopped the cultural and socio-economic life and further production of religious 
and non-religious books for two 200 years’ (ibid.).  
  In sum, virtually every imaginable aspect of modernity, ranging from capitalism to 
gender equality, was accredited to Protestantism. According to a renowned Slovenian 
sociologist of religion and founding member of the Slovenian Protestant Society, 
Protestantism has, together with the Enlightenment, fundamentally contributed to the 
formation of modern societies and the Western civilisation. Neither the modern 
democratic state nor the modern notion of human rights could exist without the 
Protestant and humanistic understanding of the human being as an individual, and 
without the associated notion of individual responsibility and freedom (Kerševan 
2002a: 23). These were also the main reasons for marking the contribution of 
Protestantism with a national holiday: 
‘As long as we live in a modern society, which respects every human being as a 
person, in a society with ideals of human freedom, equality, solidarity, in a society 
which treasures personal responsibility and eagerness to work – we live in a society 
which respects Protestant values.’ (Kerševan 2002b: 12)  
  Apart from reviving elements of nineteenth-century discourses, ideas promoted by 
the supporters of Protestantism since the late 1980s onwards included also an 
important new element. Protestantism was not only seen as conducive to economic 
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and social developments such as the spread of democracy, tolerance, individualism, 
respect for human rights, and capitalism, but was also regarded as a movement that 
played a paramount role in bringing the Slovenian nation into the realm of Europe and 
the Western civilisation. According to the current president of the Slovenian 
Protestant Society, Viktor Žakelj, Slovenians ‘spiritually became a part of Europe 
already with Trubar’ (quoted in Žolnir 2003: 4), and several scholars, state 
representatives, politicians and journalists have claimed that the translation of the 
Bible into Slovenian was the event with which Slovenians ‘entered the family of 
European nations’ (Zadravec 1994: 10). The activities of the Protestants were 
believed to be a proof of the fact that Slovenians belonged to Europe already in the 
sixteenth century (cf. Žolnir 2003: 4). In the light of that, argued some, the current 
integration into Europe is somehow redundant and ‘degrading’ (Norčič 1999: 16). 
  This congratulatory narrative did not remain unchallenged. The Slovenian Catholic 
circles subscribed to a substantially different, far less laudatory understanding of the 
role of Protestantism in the Slovenian past. Franc Rode, Archbishop of Ljubljana and 
Slovenia’s metropolitan in the period from 1997 to 2004, insisted that Protestantism 
was, to an extent, an expressly German movement, and as such alien to the Slovenian 
nation. Similarly as Slomšek in 1862, he acknowledged that Protestantism was 
instrumental in strengthening the Slovenian culture and national awareness, but added 
that this was, ‘thanks to God’, everything Slovenians gained from the movement 
(1996: 417). Catholic authors loudly disputed the claims about the privileged link 
between Protestantism and European culture, arguing that Slovenians entered Europe 
already when they adopted Christianity. They also repeatedly accused the supporters 
of Protestantism of being intolerant, of dividing Slovenians into ‘progressive 
Protestants and backward Catholics’, of abusing Protestantism to denigrate Slovenian 
Catholics, and of ignoring the fact that the present-day Catholic Church has largely 
adapted to the exigencies of the modern world (e.g. Ocvirk 1993: 3; Rozman 1996: 
11; Granda 2005: 3). However, this competing narrative, firmly rooted in the Catholic 
version of Slovenian religious nationalism, usually remained limited to expressly 
Catholic outlets. In the mainstream media, the Protestant nationalist interpretation of 
sixteenth-century developments and their consequences for Slovenians held sway.  
Conclusions 
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  For too long, nationalism theory remained trapped in a highly restrictive 
understanding of secularisation, equating it to a wholesale decline, if not outright 
disappearance of religion. Therefore, secular nationalism was long regarded as 
entirely incompatible and in fact hostile to religious nationalism. This paper has 
challenged this conviction. As Anthony Smith rightly argued, ‘faith in nation comes 
in different guises’ (Smith 2005: 415). However, not all of these guises can be 
reduced to a black-and-white opposition of anti-secular religious nationalism and anti-
religious secular nationalism. Quite to the contrary: as this paper aimed to show, 
several varieties of religious nationalism have accepted the existence, if not the 
legitimacy, of the secular state, and even fostered many modernising developments.  
  The cases discussed in the paper clearly show that nationalism is never a uniform 
and homogenous story people tell about the nation to which they belong. Instead, it 
consists of a number of separate, even competing stories that various groups within 
this nation tell about themselves (Smith 1995b, quoted in McLeod 2000: 241). Or, as 
Katherine Verdery argued: the nation should be conceived as a symbol ‘having 
multiple meanings, offered as alternatives and competed over by different groups 
manoeuvring to capture the symbol’s definition and its legitimating effects’ (Verdery 
1996: 228). While a dominant version of nationalism in a particular period may be 
secular, this does not preclude the existence of a religious nationalism attached to the 
same nation. In fact, secular nationalism, and thus also the secular state, can easily 
enter into an alliance with religious nationalism, provided that the latter is prepared to 
play by its rules.   
  Another conclusion to be drawn on the basis of arguments developed in the paper is 
that the field of nationalism studies, and particularly the study of religious 
nationalism, could profit from a more through and sustained consideration of 
developments in the study of religion. The critical revision of secularisation theory, 
which no longer sees secularisation as a linear, universal and inevitable process, does 
not only allow for a better understanding of the varieties of religious nationalism, but 
could also serve as the basis for rekindling the well-worn debate about the 
relationships between pre-modern religious communities and modern nations. In 
addition, sociologists of religion have by now examined a range of new religious 
movements. Many of these have developed nationalist inflections, and could be of 
interest to nationalism scholars as well.   
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  The final conclusion concerns the evaluation of modernist religious nationalisms. 
Given that their ideals – modernity, democracy, individualism, religious freedom etc. 
– largely coincide with values and norms constitutive of present-day democratic 
societies, one may be tempted to embrace this variety of religious nationalism as not 
being entirely harmful, perhaps even beneficial. However, as clearly evident from the 
cases discussed in the paper, modernist religious nationalisms have often tended to 
adopt an exclusivist stance, restricting the propensity for modernisation to some 
religious and national communities and denying it to others. In nineteenth-century 
Europe, Protestant nationalism went hand-in-hand with anti-Catholic prejudices, and a 
similar confluence of ‘liberal’ Protestantism and anti-Catholic sentiments remains 
active in some parts of Europe even today. Catholic nationalisms, particularly when 
bordering or competing with and Orthodox Christian nationalisms, are not immune to 
such exclusivist thinking either, nor are the Orthodox nationalisms when confronted 
with Islamic nationalist competitors. In each case, the susceptibility for democracy, 
individualism, modernity, human rights, gender equality or other modern values is 
seen as particularly compatible with some religious and national traditions, and alien 
to others. The recent debates about Turkey’s accession to the EU are a case in point: 
very often, Turkey, being a predominantly Muslim country, was seen as inherently 
incapable of adopting the norms of the EU.  This does not imply that all modernist 
religious nationalisms are of necessity so exclusive. However, they should not be 
regarded as inherently harmless either, regardless of their proclaimed support for 
liberal values and democracy. 
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i This phrase is borrowed from Anthony Smith (2005: 415). 
ii The author wishes to thank the anonymous reviewers of this journal and Oliver Zimmer for their 
helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.    
iii A note of clarification is needed at this point. The categories of ‘religious nationalism’ and ‘secular 
nationalism’, as used in this paper, do not refer to discrete species of nationalisms, nor are they meant 
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to suggest that nations can be divided into secular and religious ones. As the cases discussed further in 
the paper attest, the same nationalism can develop both religious and secular varieties which can 
coexist in a range of different relationships stretching from competition to mutual reinforcement. I 
thank one of the anonymous reviewers for alerting me to this potential misunderstanding.     
iv This also means that the dichotomy between religion and nationalism is not, as some scholars of 
religious nationalism would suggest, a necessary element of the Western discourse on modernity. 
Instead, it is an element of only one particular version of the modernist narrative – a version which 
became dominant in the twentieth century. The alternative version, which permeated the debate on 
modernisation in the nineteenth century, did not see any necessary contradiction between religion and 
modernity. Quite to the contrary: it was based on the belief that modernity itself has arisen from, and 
has been crucially facilitated by religion.  
v Sixteenth-century Carniola was a part of the Austrian circle of the Holy Roman Empire which 
covered most of the territory now belonging to Slovenia. 
